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When I was asked to give this talk, it was suggested that my
topic be "The Law Confronts Expanding Technology." This, I thought,
was an inappropriate topic. However true it may be that the law is
a static, backwards-looking force in our society, it simply is not true
that the law confronts or in any sense resists technological advance.
On the contrary, our entire legal system reflects a tolerant, indeed a
benevolent, attitude towards technological advance. This is reflected
in the patent system rooted in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the
Constitution to "promote the progress of science and useful arts," in
our tax laws, and in our predisposition for political and economic
freedom. Even our common law system has evidenced a disposition to
balance pre-existing rights in the status quo against the benefits of
technological advance, and generally to sacrifice the former in favor
of the latter.
It is important to any discussion of this topic that there be a
clear understanding of what "law" is. It is, first of all, a body of
rules governing individual activity and relationships among the various
actors in society. These rules are found in the vast body of judicial
decisions applying the common law. They are also found in statutory
enactments and the rules of administrative agencies, as well as in
judicial and agency decisions interpreting these statutes and rules.
The law is also a process of decision-making as lawyers representing
clients with clashing interests seek to have their clients' interests
enhanced, protected, or vindicated before the courts, administrative
agencies, and legislative bodies.
When a new technology emerges, it is brought forth into a social
environment which includes pre-existing technology and is not necessarily
applicable to the new technology or the peculiar social problems which
the new technology may bring. For example, when the first automobiles
came into existence, there was no law directly applicable to automobiles.
There were, however, laws applicable to the use of thoroughfares, to
the rights of pedestrians, and to the rights, duties, and liabilities
of persons who used horses or horse-drawn vehicles. As the use of the
automobile impinged on existing legally protected interests, it became
necessary for the courts to consider whether, and the extent to which,
existing law was applicable to the automobile. What were the respec-
tive rights of users of automobiles and users of horse-drawn vehicles?
Were automobiles vehicles within the meaning of statutes written in
contemplation of horse-drawn vehicles and bicycles? Were the rules
of the road applicable to these new-fangled devices? The courts
grappled with these problems on a case-by-case basis as lawyers repre-
senting the adversary interests of their clients argued pro and con on
these issues, and ultimately, through a process of trial and error, a
body of law directly applicable to automobiles began to emerge. Over
a period of time the legislatures also began to take cognizance of
the automobile, and statutes began to emerge providing for registration
of motor vehicles, licensing of operators, inspection, traffic control,
liability, etc.
Development of this new body of law directly applicable to auto-
mobiles could have operated as either a deterrent or an incentive -
to the growth of the automobile technology. We know in retrospect
that the incentives, including development of highways, far outweighed
the deterrents. Only in recent years, as our legislatures have
addressed themselves to problems of safety and pollution, have there
been indications that law may be moving in the direction of deterrence.
Let me now attempt a generalized description of the legal system
as it confronts expanding technology.
The first response of the legal system to a new technology has
characteristically been to deal with the problem entirely as a matter
of private law. Legal problems are dealt with within the framework
of disputes between private interests: The private parties who are
using the technology versus the private parties who may be injured or
threatened by the technology. Government, through its judicial
processes, acts as the impartial umpire for the resolution of these
disputes. As the principles and the wisdom of the past, found in
judicial precedent, are applied on a trial-and-error basis to the new
problems emerging from the new technology, the process of decision-
making in specific litigations results in the emergence of new prece-
dents specifically applicable to the new problems. The emergence of
this new body of law creates legal rights and legal duties which
become a part of the general legal environment in which the technology
develops and is used. The existence of legal rights and duties
operates to internalize the social costs of the technology and becomes,
to some degree, a deterrent to the advance of the technology. The net
result of this process is that our society permits the technology to
cause social disruptions and injury on the theory that the legal system
will provide monetary compensation to persons whose legal rights have
been violated.
There frequently comes a time, however, when society regards the
existence of the disruptions and injuries caused by the technology as
unacceptable, and the focus of law-making then shifts from the courts
to the legislatures. Whereas the process of law-making by the courts
is piecemeal, random, and highly indirect, legislative action is
positive, deliberate, and direct. The legislative action may be in
the form of new rules redefining the rights and duties of private
persons with respect to the technology, or it may be in the form of
positive regulation of the technology. It should be recognized,
however, that the legislative process usually operates slowly and
uncertainly. It is always characterized by inertia and usually also
by considerable friction which arises from strenuous efforts by the
sponsors of the technology to resist legislative action which will
adversely affect their economic interests. As a consequence, the
initial legislative action is usually based on political compromise
and the enactment, viewed in retrospect, is rarely adequate and
remains to be modified in later successive legislative actions as
society reaches the conclusion that the disruptions and injuries
remain unacceptable.
By and large the system I have described has worked reasonably
well over most of the history of Anglo-American law. This is not to
say that it has not permitted immense injury, which could have been
avoided. Obviously, for example, automobile technology has produced
immense slaughter on our highways which could have been substantially
lessened had our law-making institutions come to grips with the
problem of automobile safety at an earlier date. On the other hand,
there is little question in my mind that, had our current concern with
automobile safety arisen in the 1920's or 1930's, our technological
progress as measured by the present state of the automobile would have
been substantially retarded. When I say, therefore, that the system
has worked reasonably well, I am saying that it has provided a frame-
work for enabling technological advance on the assumption that even
considerable disruption and injury is an acceptable price to pay for
this advance.
The present interest in technology assessment reflects the
growing view in our society that such disruption and injury may no
longer be acceptable. This view has come into being largely as a
consequence of the recognition that the technologies of today and
tomorrow may be producing disruptions and injuries which go to the
question of survival itself, and that technological advance is
occurring at so rapid a rate that intolerable and irreversible
levels or injury may be sustained before we are even aware of the
fact that the technology involves a capacity to produce injury.
As a lawyer, I see the function of technology assessment as
being twofold: first, to provide for legislative action designed to
channel technological advance along lines which are regarded as
optimal from the standpoint of society's interests; and, second, to
encourage and promote legislative action which will deal decisively
with, the potential disruptions and injuries caused by technology at
a much earlier stage of the growth of the technology than is feasible
under the present legal system.
Implementation of the first of these objectives would involve
the substitution of governmental decisions for the operation of the
market as a determinant of the allocation of resources. Government
would presumably discourage less optimum technologies through tax
or restrictive regulatory actions and would encourage more optimum
technologies through benevolent regulation, tax incentives, or subsidy.
Government, as a benevolent big brother, would make a value judgment
on what is good for society, and this decision would have the effect
of limiting the present right of the public to vote with its dollars
in the market place as to what products it wants and what negative
consequences it is willing to accept in order to have the benefits
it desires. If, for example, technology assessment should result in
a legislative decision that cheap but dangerous lawn mowers are
verboten, lawn movers would become unavailable to a segment of the
public which can afford only cheap lawn mowers and is prepared to
assume the risks in order to have the benefits.
Implementation of the second objective would involve a rigorous
analysis of the potential benefits, costs, and risks of a technology
and the striking of a balance on the basis of which the legislatures
would make a judgment as to whether a green light or a red light
should be flashed for further development and use of the technology,
and if
 3a green light, the manner in which the technology should
proceed. Here again a value judgment would be made as to whether
benefits outweigh risks and costs. In this connection, it should be
noted that the evaluation of both benefits and risks is based more on
predictive judgments than on experience. Benefits, moreover, are
usually much more obvious and immediate than risks, which, when con-
sidered on a predictive basis, tend to be remote, speculative, and
subject to technological fixes (hoped for) that will minimize them.
This concept gives me, as a lawyer, some concern. An explicit legis-
lative judgment that benefits outweigh risks could well have the
effect of impairing or limiting the right of members of the public
to seek legal redress or relief if they regarded the risks as unaccep-
table to them. For example, a legislative determination that a certain
level of aircraft noise is acceptable in the light of the social
benefits of aircraft might well have the effect of precluding someone
who is in fact injured by the noise from obtaining redress or relief
in the courts.
In a large sense, there is really nothing unique or novel in
consequences of this kind. Our legislatures have always made decisions
of this nature and these consequences have in fact resulted. Still,
technology assessment adds a new dimension which troubles me. Obviously
no one could seriously question the desirability of our legislatures'
having the maximum possible amount of authoritative information on
benefits, risks and costs on the basis of which decisions may be made.
It is institutionalization of the process of providing such information
to the legislatures which troubles me. Most of the recent discussion
of technology assessment seems to proceed on the assumption that there
exist valid processes through which benefits and risks can be identified
and quantified, and alternatives set forth, by specialized elite groups,
and that the legislatures can then make "correct" decisions in the
light of value judgments. Indeed, some spokesmen for technology
assessment go even further and talk as if the assessment exercise
would be a waste of time if the legislatures did not reach the
correct judgment indicated in the assessment. My own view is that
neither benefits nor risks can be identified, let alone quantified,
and that alternatives cannot be articulated, without some large value
judgments on the part of the assessors as to what the public would
regard as benefits and risks and the importance attached by the public
to each item of benefit and risk. Thus, my concern is that the insti-
tutionalized technology assessment mechanism will serve to the legis-
latures a predigested body of information rooted in the value judgments
of a small, narrow, elite group and that the result of the assessment
process, if taken seriously by the legislatures, will greatly constrain
the operation of the democratic processes in the ultimate decision-
making exercise.
My concern in this respect is mitigated only by my confidence that
technology assessments of this kind, no matter how authoritative the
assessment body may be, will not in fact be accepted as conclusive by
members of legislative bodies. The assessment will in all liklihood
be just another informational input into the legislative process, and
legislative enactments will still be based on political compromises
reflecting the prejudices, interests, and responses by legislators to
the interests of their constituencies.
In short, therefore, I believe technology assessment is a highly
useful exercise in maximizing the information available to legislatures,
but I believe that those who regard it as a panacea, or even as an
important form of therapy, are taking the concept much too seriously.
A final point I would like to make relates to the role of the
law itself in technology assessment. Since legislation resulting from
_ technology assessment will be new law superseding or supplementing
existing law, it is important that existing law be considered in the
process of assessment. Moreover, since new law always has a disruptive
effect on expectations and commitments arrived at under old law, it
seems to me to be generally desirable that new legislation should make
the least possible change in the law consistent with accomplishing
the desired objective. This means, I think, that proposed alternative
courses of action set forth in a technology assessment should include
an assessment of the first order and secondary order consequences of
any suggested changes in the law. In addition, before a technology
assessment flashes a green light for advance of a technology, considera-
tion should be given to what legal changes may be necessary in the long
run to regulate that technology. For example, one can visualize that
some of the emerging biomedical technologies may require regulatory
laws which could have a profound effect on traditional individual free-
doms. The necessity for such laws is obviously a kth-order consequence
of the technology and should be considered in the assessment process.
Thus, the technological capability of predetermining the sex or the
physical or mental attributes of a baby could well create social con-
ditions necessitating the licensing and regulation of marriage, concep-
tion, or birth. Possibilities of this kind should be considered in
technology assessments.
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In this connection, I throw out a word of caution to those of
you who believe that this a "lawyer-ridden world." Institutionaliza-
tion of technology assessment could well lead to the massive intrusion
of legalistic processes into the assessment function. There already
is an example of how this could happen. It has been suggested that
the National Environmental Policy Act involves something closely akin
to technology assessment. NEPA became law on January 1, 1970. There
is no indication that anyone thought it would give rise to a spate of
litigation. In its 30 months or so of life to date, there have been
well over 100 court decisions involving NEPA and its procedures dealing
with such questions as when NEPA is applicable; what elements must be
considered in NEPA statements; who and what interests must and may
participate in the NEPA process; etc. The same thing can happen to
technology assessment.
Finally, it should be recognized that the process of technology
assessment discussed today is neither the beginning point nor the
ending point in society's assessment of technology. Society has
always had mechanisms for technology assessment. Today, the market
place, the legal system, and the insurance mechanism all play an
important role in technology assessment. If an institutionalized
technology assessment mechanism is created, this will be superimposed
upon and supplement the existing structure. The outputs of this
assessment mechanism, assuming they are reflected in legislative
action, will not be self-executing. They will merely change the rules
of the game, and the marketplace, the legal system, and the insurance
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mechanism will continue to perform their own assessment functions
under the new rules.
It is interesting, I believe, to note that the legal profession
has shown relatively little interest in technology assessment. This
is perhaps due to the fact that those from other disciplines who
have been immersed in the assessment problem have not adequately
recognized the relevance of legal institutions in technology
assessment and therefore have not called for the lawyers' help. On
the other hand, it may be that from the standpoint of the legal
profession, the old maxim is relevant: "The more things seem to
change, the more they are the same."
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